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Abstract
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of media scrutiny and a
networked governance of National and International Government Organisation (IGOs) on the
extent of voluntary corporate disclosure in the global telecommunication sector in response to
incidents of corporate bribery.
Design/Methodology/Approach: An anti-bribery disclosure categorisation index was developed
from various anti-bribery guidelines developed by IGOs to collect and analyse the data used in
this study. This study relied on a content analysis of news media articles, corporate annual reports
and standalone sustainability reports (from 1995-2010) of two global telecommunication
companies [Alcatel-Lucent — a French based global company; Siemens AG — a German based
global company], to understand corporate performance disclosures on combating corporate
bribery.
Findings: The findings underpinned by a joint consideration of legitimacy theory, media agenda
setting theory and responsive regulation theory, show that the change in corporate disclosures on
combating bribery were positively associated with the extent of negative media attention and the
movement of IGOs in combating corporate bribery in global corporations. A system of
networked- governance with IGOs appears to have a significant influence on international
business practice.
Originality/Value: In the context of the literature on social accounting, this is believed to be the
first known study to document and understand the trend in anti-bribery related performance
disclosures and the influence of external stakeholders on such practices.
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1. Introduction
There is growing international concern over the ethical practices of companies operating
globally. Bribery in particular has broad social and economic implications that have the
potential to bring great harm to society as evidenced by the highly corrupt activities in
countries in Central and Easter Europe, Asia and Africa (Buscaglia, 1996; Gray & Jarosz,
1995; EIRIS, 2005). Whilst corruption is a problem that has significant implications for
the developing world (Apke, 201), it is corporations domiciled in developed nations that
represent the suppliers of bribery payment which contribute to the problems facing
developing nations by participating in such activity with corrupt public officials. Bribery
occurs when an inducement (financial or non-financial) is offered to public officials to
conduct business or gain an advantage (Sanyal, 2005), particularly when all other options
to conduct business in the host economy have been exhausted. A bribe can speed up
work-in-progress or the issue of licenses, often referred to as a ‘facilitating payment’ or it
can be create a monopolistic market position (Shahabuddin, 2002; Argandona, 2007). In
the latter scenario, corporate bribery has the potential to create a serious economic, social,
political and moral blight, especially in emerging countries. Recent empirical evidence
suggests that bribery has a major impact on developing countries in which resources and
opportunities are limited compared with developed countries (Apke, 2001).

Combating bribery has become a major concern for national governments, international
governmental organisations (IGOs), non-government organisations (NGOs), trade
associations and business organisations (Sanyal, 2005). In recent years a number of
international organisations and NGOs have focused their attention on the need to combat
bribery and corruption and on the underlying need to improve standards of corporate
accountability, ethics, transparency and integrity (EIRIS, 2005). IGOs and NGOs have
implemented initiatives to combat bribery by soliciting Multi-National Corporations
(MNCs) to disclose adequate information in relation to corporate anti-bribery policies
(including accounting policies) and to disclose how such policies are implemented (see
for example: Organisation for Economic, Corporation & Development (OECD), 2009;
Transparency International, 2009). Despite growing international concern on this issue
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and the proliferation of international guidelines on combating corporate bribery, there is
limited research on how MNCs incorporate or adopt such guidelines and how anti-bribery
practices are disclosed. Furthermore, this paper represents a response to calls for further
research in social and environmental accounting as well as accountability in relation to
corporate ethical practices (Parker, 2005).

Prior research on corporate bribery has focused on the economic, social and ethical
impacts of such behaviour (see for example, Shahabuddin, 2002; Apke, 2001; Sung,
2005; George et al., 2000; Mauro, 1995; Hamra, 2000; Rose-Ackerman, 1999;
Argandona, 2007; Sanyal, 2005). Despite growing interest on the social and ethical
implications and related discourse on corporate bribery, there is a lack of research that
examines how global corporations adopt measures to combat bribery beyond a corporate
code of conduct and how such measures are disclosed through their external reporting
mechanisms. In accounting, research has examined various social and environmental
issues (see for example: Deegan et al, 2002, Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Islam & Deegan,
2008; Deegan & Blomquist, 2006; Parker, 2005), however there is little research on
specific social issues such as corporate bribery. Prior research in social accounting has
focused on both general (see Deegan et al, 2002, Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Islam &
Deegan, 2008; Deegan & Blomquist, 2006) and specific social issues that includes: child
labour (Islam and Deegan, 2010), climate change (Hague & Deegan, 2010), and human
rights (Islam & McPhail, 2011), to understand how corporations respond to social issues
through their disclosure strategies. This study seeks to add to the existing literature by
focusing on ‘corporate bribery’ and broadening the scope of emerging research in social
accounting. This study is centred on two global telecommunication companies that
represent an industry affected by global corruption (Argandona 2001, 2007; Elliott, 1997;
Jain, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 1999).

A number of IGOs and NGOs provide extensive guidance to global companies on antibribery policies and procedures. As such, this paper examines the extent to which the
anti-bribery guidelines of IGOs and NGOs have influenced the MNCs corporate
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disclosure reporting on combating bribe. The global media similarly acts as an
intermediary in coordinating and communicating the global concern between the
companies and its stakeholders. Therefore, it is in the public interest to understand the
role of global news media in influencing corporate reporting practices in relation to
bribery. In recent decades, the telecommunication sector has witnessed a significant
increase in bribery activity resulting from the rapid growth and expansion of
telecommunication services in emerging economies with the proliferation of new markets
and increasing competition from a relaxation of regulatory constraints allowing multiple
service providers to participate in previously closed markets [Experts in Responsible
Investment Solution (EIRIS 2005)]. An examination of the telecommunication sector
provides further insight on social accounting research that is currently dominated by
research in environmentally sensitive industries that includes mining and chemical
(Parker, 2005).

The theoretical framework for this paper was derived from multiple theories that relied
on a combination of legitimacy theory, responsive regulation theory and media agenda
setting theory. The objective of this paper is to determine the influence of bribery related
media scrutiny and the interventions of IGOs on the extent of voluntary corporate
disclosures by two global telecommunication companies on combating corporate bribery.
Data sources that rely on media articles, corporate annual reports and sustainability
reports for the period 1995 to 2010 found that and the media and IGOs have a direct and
positive impact on the disclosures in relation to combating bribery. Whist disclosures
increased with external pressure, the sample corporations in this study were reluctant to
disclose negative information on the bribery incidents for which they were accused of.
The findings suggest that media scrutiny and a networked-governance of IGOs cause
MNCs to increase corporate disclosures. However, it appears that corporations make such
disclosures to maintain legitimacy rather than create a substantive change in their
accountability practices.
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The balance of this paper is structured as follows. The next section sets the context in
which this paper is based by describing the two sample corporations (Alcatel-Lucent, and
Siemens AG) that are analysed in this paper, the extent of corporate bribery within the
global Telecommunication Industry and the regulatory environment in which such
companies operate. Section three provides the theoretical framework and literature
review combining legitimacy theory, responsive regulation theory and media agenda
setting theory. Section four explains the research method employed in this study. Section
five provides the results of the study. The final section outlines the concluding remarks.

2. The Context of Corporate Bribery
The sample of corporations relied upon for this study was selected on the basis of media
attention allocated to bribery related incidents. This study examined media articles within
the telecommunication industry over a period of 16 years (1995-2010) using the DowJones FACTIVA database. Two global telecommunication companies, Alcatel-Lucent,
and Siemens AG, were identified for attracting significant media attention in relation to
bribery activity. These companies are among those of European origin that appear to be
mostly affected from bribery related scandals in the past two decades. Unlike in the US
which prohibits corporate bribery and deems bribery as a criminal offence, [Foreign
Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA, 1977)], 1 European companies until recently have been
regulated by a relatively soft and voluntary mechanism to combat corporate bribery to
foreign officials for personal and corporate self interest. The evidence suggests (see for
example, EIRIS, 2005) that European companies appeared to be more visible in terms of
receiving bribe related allegations.

2.1 Background to Alcatel-Lucent and Siemens AG
Alcatel-Lucent was incorporated in France and is a leader in mobile communications,
optics technology, and communication solutions, with more than 27,900 patents and
services more than 130 countries around the world including U.K., U.S.A. Australia,

1

The FCPA (1977) was the first national legislation designed to address the bribe in international business
(Sanyal, 2005).
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Canada, China, India, Russia, and Italy. In 2010, annual revenue was approximately €16
billion derived from North America 36%, Europe 32%, Asia Pacific 18%, and rest of the
world 14%. 2. The success of the company’s has not been achieved without criticism.
Alcatel-Lucent has been accused of allegedly bribing officials to secure contracts in
several countries including Costa Rica, Honduras, Taiwan, Malaysia, Kenya and China.
In 2004, the allegation of bribery in Costa Rica was seen as the company’s most
devastating incident of bribery in its history. Company officials including former
president of Alcatel Latin America pleaded guilty in the U.S. district court of violations
against the FCPA and were sentenced to 30 months imprisonment; three years supervised
release, the forfeiture of US$261,500, and a US$200,000 special assessment (Annual
Report, 2008, pp. 255-256).

Siemens AG, the second company selected for this study was incorporated in Germany
and is listed on the German, London, Swiss and New York stock exchanges. The
company operates in more than 190 countries including US, UK, Australia, China, Swiss,
France, Russia, Saudi Arabia and India. In 2010, the company had more than 405,000
employees, revenue amounted to €28 billion and held 14,000 green patents. 3 As of 2008,
there were a significant number of ongoing investigations into allegations of public
corruption and bribery involving the company in countries around the world including
Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, China, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel,
Italy, Malaysia, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Russia, Switzerland, Vietnam and the U.S.
(Siemens AG, Annual report, 2008, pp. 275-276). According to the sentencing remarks of
the Munich district court, Siemens AG were involved in 77 cases of bribing public
officials between 2001 to 2004 in Russia, Nigeria and Libya (Annual Report, 2008, p.
275). Siemens AG announced that it would accrue a provision of approximately €1
billion in the fiscal year 2008 in connection with ongoing discussions with the Munich
public prosecutor, the SEC and the DOJ for the purpose of resolving their respective
investigations (Siemens AG, Annual Report, 2008, pp. 275-276).

2
3

See corporate website: http://www.alcatel-lucent.com.
See corporate website: http://www.siemens.com.
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2.2 Corporate Bribery in the Telecommunication Sector
The telecommunication sector is one of most distressed industries in relation to incidents
of bribery (EIRIS, 2005). For example, the telecommunication sector in China is
considered

to

be

the

most

corrupt

sector

in

the

Chinese

economy

(http://www.china.org.cn/business) and the second most corrupt sector in India (KPMG,
2011). The significance of telecommunications is explained in part by the high level of
public procurement or public licensing which lends itself to bribery demands from
corrupt

public

officials

or

politicians

(OECD,

2009).

The

International

Telecommunications Union (ITU) is a specialised agent of UN responsible for
developing adequate and safe infrastructure in telecommunication and information
networks

and

(http://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx)

competition is a major cause contributing

according

to bribery in

the

to

the

ITU,

international

telecommunication sector. In 1990, only three countries worldwide (Japan, UK, & US)
allowed competition in international telecommunications, in 2005, there were more than
48 countries with two or more players offering telecommunication services including
developed to developing counties (ITU, 2008). With time, increasing competition led
corporations to search for new markets in order to gain a competitive advantage. With
low-cost developing countries creating economic opportunities it also created a high
number of bribery scandals mostly occurring in the last two decades (ITU, 2008).
2.3. The response to international corporate bribery
As a result of local community concern over bribery in the telecommunication sector,
local government authorities have sought to control corporate behaviour in line with the
guidelines of national and global organisations such as NGOs and IGOs. The response by
such organisations is to provide anti-bribery policies and procedures for both local
authorities and business groups. For example, the role of the Bangladesh
Telecommunication and Regulation Commission (BTRC) is to monitor industry activities
and investigate complaints (BTRC, 2002) taking on an increasingly significant role since
the Siemens bribery scandal of 2008 (http://www.btrc.gov.bd). On a broader level, the
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Learning Initiatives on Reforms for Network Economies (LIRNEaisa) represents a
regional ICT policy regulation provider across Asia Pacific nations to control the problem
of bribery in a co-regulatory environment between public and private sector actors
(http://lirneasia.net/projects/rapid-response-program).

Various international and regional organisations (IGOs) and regulatory authorities have
actively engaged this problem by implementing and developing a number of anti-bribery
movements (see Table 1). IGOs have become actively involved in the fight against
corruption by implementing and developing various anti-bribery movements (Wang and
Rosenau, 2001; Mccoy, 2001; Scott, 2003) that have occurred on an international 4 and
regional basis. 5 In spite of an impressive global anti-bribery movement the problem of
corruption remains. As Pacini et al. (2002, p.401) argue, no one expects that any set of
rules will totally eliminate efforts to seek or accept bribes, this would require a
fundamental change in human nature, however there is an expectation that a uniform set
of rules could significantly curtail corrupt behaviours, as long as those rules are both
enforceable and enforced.

4

These include the OECD-country reports on the implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
and the 1997 revised recommendations, the UN declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International
Commercial Transaction 1999, World Bank-Governance and Anti-Corruption 2007, World Economic
Forum- Partnering against Corruption Forum 2010, International Chamber of Commerce- Anti-Corruption
Commission, TRACE International Bribe Line, Transparency International, and Partnership for
Transparency Fund (PTF).
5
For example, within the China and East Asia like Asia Development Bank, Asia Monitor, china.org.cn,
China CSR, and within South Asia like Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Asian
Association for Regional Corporation (SAARC), Pacific Island Forum Secretariats, and TI-Asia and the
pacific and within the Middle East and Central Asia like corporation council for the Arab Stated of the Gulf
(Gulf Cooperation council), Asian Co-Operation Dialogue (ACD), New Eurasia, Central Asian Union and
within Russia, like Moscow Launches Major Anti-Corruption Drive, within Africa like The Africa
Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project (AfriMAP), The New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD) and the World Bank - Africa (OECD,2009).
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Table 1: Major IGOs in anti-bribery activities
Organisation for Economic ,Co-operation, & Development (OECD)- OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the
1997 revised recommendation
In 2000, Anti-Briber Convention recommendation on export credit and credit guarantee which state that
government are obliged to take action to deter and sanction bribery of foreign public officials in international
business supported by official export credit.
The Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAI) was launched in February 2000 at the call of the stability pact
for South Easter Europe.
2009 recommendation for further combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business
transactions
United NationsTenth Principle of the United Nations Global Compact launched on July 2000
In 2003, the General Assembly adopted the UN designated 9 December as International Anti-Corruption day
UN Convention against Corruption entered into force on 14 December 2005.
World Bank- adopted new Governance and Anti-Corruption strategy in March 2007. include seven principles
guide to fight global corruption
World Economic Forum- Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACE) 2010.
International Chamber of Commerce- ICC Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery in International
Business Transactions (1996 edition)
TRACE International – Anti –bribery compliance program and Anti-bribery risk assessments 2001
Transparency International (TI)Introduced the “Corruption Fighters’ Tool Kit”- civil society experiences and emerging strategies in 2001 and later
in 2002, and 2004 make some edition.
TI Six steps implementation process to support the business principles for countering bribery in 2003, then 2009
edition with greater emphasis on public reporting of anti-bribery system and in recommending that external
verification and assurance of their ( business) anti-bribery program.
TI first launched Annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in 1995 but in 2010, TI introduced more advance CPI
which measured the perceived level of public sector corruption in 178 countries around the world.
Bribery Payers’ Index (BPI) was introduced in 1999 which evaluate the supply side of corruption
Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) was launched on 9 December 2010 which is a survey that assesses general
public attitudes toward, and experience of corruption in dozens of countries around the world.
Partnership for Transparency Fund (PTF)- PTF’s Citizens Against Corruption Program (CAC)

IGOs are the active actors in providing guidelines for corporations to adopt anti-bribery
policies and practices. The broader roles of these organisations are to protect public
interest by exerting pressure upon corporations to be socially and ethically accountable.
There are a number of IGOs that have as their agenda to fight corporate corruption and
one of the largest IGOs to fight corruption and bribery in corporate and public area is
Transparency International (TI). TI is a non-profit organisation formed in 1993 by former
World Bank officials with vision of the supporting global community by curbing global
corruption and bribery. As TI mention (TI, 2009):
Transparency International is the global civil society organisation leading the fight against
corruption. Through more than 90 chapters worldwide and an international secretariat in
Berlin, Germany, TI raises awareness of the damaging effects of corruption and works with
partners in government, business and civil society to develop and implement effective
measures to tackle it (p.17).
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TI publishes annually a Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and a Bribe Payers Index
(BPI). These indices are based on surveys and impound a number of factors. A key factor
in the CPI is the extent to which bribes are accepted by public officials. According to the
most recent TI survey the most corrupt countries are: Somalia, Haiti, Iraq, Myanmar,
Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, Sudan, New Guinea and Bangladesh (TI, 2009). Along with TI,
the OECD is another leading global IGO that has taken various steps to control this issue
for the benefit of the global society. As mentioned by the OECD:
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention establishes legally binding standards to criminalise
bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions and provides for a
host of related measures that make this effective. It is the first and only international anticorruption instrument focused on the ‘supply side’ of the bribery transaction. The 34
OECD member countries and four non-member countries - Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria,
and South Africa - have adopted this Convention (OECD, 2011, www.OECE.org/ home
page).

The Bribery Convention of the OECD’s played an important role when the signatory
countries accounted for over 70 per cent of the world’s exports and over 90 per cent of
foreign investment (Aronoff, 1998). The OECD has adopted various forms of legal and
ethical instruments in order to fight global bribery and corruption. 6 In 2009, the OECD
recommendation on tax measures to further combat the bribing of foreign public officials
in international business transactions was a key anti-bribery strategy with many countries
amending tax law to disallow deductions for bribe payments. In 2010, the OECD
approved “Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying” representing the first
international policy instrument to provide guidance for policy-makers on how to promote
good governance principles in lobbying (OECD, 2011, www.OECE.org/ home page).

The growing global concern over bribery has seen national regulating authorities
teaming-up with IGOs to launch various activities to protect the telecommunication

6

Such as: the 1998 recommendation on improving ethical conduct in the public service; the 2003
recommendation for managing conflicts of interest in the public service; the 2006 recommendation on
bribery and export credit; and the 2008 recommendation on enhancing integrity in public procurement.
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industry and businesses from bribery induced activities. In response to increasing
accountability requirements and implicit pressure from IGOs, a total of 38 countries have
agreed to put in place measures to prevent, detect and investigate foreign bribery with the
adoption of the OECD recommendations against corruption (OECD, 2011). The
increasing activities of IGOs such the OECD have eventually seen its way into the
activities of corporations. For example, under these arrangements, corporations have
established a monitoring mechanism to ensure the thorough implementation of the
international obligations accepted under the OECD the convention (OECD, 2011).
Furthermore, domestic laws have been amended to better enforce existing law and
regulation that prohibits domestic bribery of domestic officials (Apke, 2001).

Another group of actors that are active to create change in corporate accountabilities is
the media. The media plays a significant role in changing public perceptions and
corporate behaviour in relation to corruption and bribery (Stapenhurst, 2000; Heimann,
1997; Burnham, 1977). A free and open press can reinforce the demand public
accountability against corruption and bribery and as such the media provides a form of
protection (Heimann, 1997). The media not only raises public awareness about corruption
and bribery but also investigates and reports incidents of bribery aiding other
investigative agencies. As Stapenhurst (2000) mentions:
The media can act as a force against corruption in ways that are both tangible and
intangible. The tangible, readily identifiable, ways in which the news media perform this
function include those in which some sort of visible outcome can be attributed to a
particular news story or series of stories—for instance, launching of investigation by
authorities, the scrapping of a law or policy that fosters a climate ripe with opportunities
for corruption, the impeachment or forced resignation of a crooked politician, the firing of
an official, the launching of judicial proceedings, the issuing of public recommendations by
watch dog body , and so on. Intangible effects, by contrast, can be characterised as those
checks on corruption which arise from broader social climate of enhanced political
pluralism, enlivened public debate and a heightened sense of accountability among
politicians, public bodies and institutions that are inevitably the by-product of a hardhitting, independent news media (p.3)…Reporting, for example, may prompt public bodies
to launch formal investigation into allegation of corruptions (p.4).
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Overall, corporations appear to be responsive to bribe related allegations when they find
such allegations are sensitive to the expectations of the wider community. Some
managers, eager to become pre-emptively responsive to media attention, react to such
pressures to protect public image of themselves and their organisations. As Stapenhurst,
(2000, p. 4) mentions:
And even before anything has been published, mere inquiries by reporters (journalists)
about apparent wrongdoing (bribery) can elicit pre-emptive responses by authorities eager
to protect public image of their institutions before any allegations have been aired.

3. Theoretical Framework
The influence of the media and IGOs on the anti-bribery, accountability and the
disclosure practices of corporations can be underpinned by a joint consideration of
legitimacy theory, media agenda setting theory and responsive regulation theory. An
overview of these theories is provided below.

3.1 Legitimacy theory
Legitimacy theory is useful for understanding and providing insight into the motivation
for social disclosures that include efforts to combat corporate bribery. Legitimacy theory
posits that the value system of organisations is congruent with the value system of the
society in which organisations operate (Lindblom, 1994). In other words, the theory
provides insight on why organisations conform to the expectations of the community.
Legitimacy theory suggests that organisations are constrained to act in strict compliance
within the terms of their “social contract” (Deegan et al., 2002). The social contract in
turn represents the multitude of explicit and implicit expectations that society expects
from organisations in the way they conduct their operations (Donaldson, 1982; Deegan &
Blomquist, 2006). The value statements of many corporations that represent its social
commitments appear to conform to the expectations of the community that underlies
legitimacy theory. For example, the values statement published in Siemens AG, Annual
Report, (2010) appears congruent with the value systems of the larger community:
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We're committed to acting responsibly in everything we do. For our customers, we're a
reliable partner. For the societies in which we do business, we're a good corporate citizen.
For our employees, we're an attractive, long-term employer. And for our shareholders, we
generate sustainable growth in our company's value. Not only do we act in accordance with
the highest professional and ethical standards; we also demand that our business partners,
suppliers and other stakeholders meet these standards as well (Annual Report, 2010 p.7).

Similar statements can also be found from Alcatel-Lucent, the CEO mentioned:
Corporate Responsibility is our business imperative. It defines our organization. It is based
on respect for our fellow citizens and the value we bring to those communities where we
operate (Corporate social Responsibility Report, 2010, p.4).

Societal expectations on business operations are not constant and change occurs when
corporate executives feel they need to respond to changing community expectations in
order to maintain their legitimacy (Deegan & Blomquist, 2006; Islam & Deegan, 2008;
Tilling & Tilt, 2010). Corporate executives similarly respond when the corporation is
involved or linked to a major incident with negative social or environmental implications.
Corporate executives respond to such incidents via different communication strategies
that inform the public of an organisation’s legitimacy seeking activities (Deegan et al.,
2002). Legitimacy theory is often relied upon as the theoretical lens to examine corporate
social disclosures and the interaction between an organisation and its physical and social
environment (Owen, 2008). In a US study, Patten (1992) utilised the legitimacy theory
framework to evaluate the effect of the Exxon Valdez oil spill on the annual report
disclosure practices of North American petroleum firms. Patten (1992) reported a
significant increase in corporate disclosure in relation to environmental issues. This
finding is consistent with legitimacy theory in which the extent of positive corporate
disclosure increases in the wake of a legitimacy crisis. In an Australian study, Deegan &
Rankin (1996) examined the social and environmental disclosure made by firms
prosecuted by the New South Wales and Victorian Environmental Protection Authority
for breaching various environmental protection laws during the 1990 and 1993. The
findings confirm previous research indicating that in the absence of regulation affecting
13

the disclosure of environmental issues, Australian companies only provide environmental
information that is favourable to their corporate image.

Corporations that face a social or environmental crisis and a subsequent threat of losing
their legitimacy feel a need to demonstrate their commitment to the community through
their reporting practices (Suchman, 1995). Prior accounting research confirms that
organisations disclose social and environmental information within their reporting media
to maintain legitimacy in the society in which they operate (Deegan & Blomquist, 2006;
Islam & Deegan, 2010; O’Donovan, 2002). Consistent with prior research in social and
environmental accounting, we would expect organisations facing a legitimacy crisis via
the incidents of bribery and corruption will take corrective action and disclose related
performance information on their efforts to combat bribery. For example, in the Siemens
AG, Sustainability Report (2008) states:
Our compliance program based on the two pillars prevents, detect and respond. This
system is the basis of all measures against corruption in the company. In fiscal 2008,
we extended our compliance organisation, raised our employee’s awareness of the
risks of corruption and established control system which enable weak point to be
detected and eliminated…to regain the trust of our stakeholder (p.170).

Such disclosures provide some evidence of the Siemens’ commitment to fight bribery and
corruption in order to maintain or regain the trust of their stakeholders. In applying
legitimacy theory, the expectation in this study is that companies within the
telecommunication sector will increase their corporate disclosure in regard to the antibribery practices in order to maintain or regain their legitimacy.
3.2 Media-agenda setting theory
While legitimacy theory posits that organisations respond to community expectations,
media agenda setting theory explains how the media shapes community expectations.
Media agenda setting theory grounded in journalism and mass communication literature
posits that the media shapes public awareness and concern for particular issues
(McCombs & Shaw, 1972). The influence of the media with its vast resources ensures
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that major incidents are brought to the attention of the public almost instantaneously.
Ader (1995) investigated pollution-related issues and found that the media agenda and the
public agenda were positively related to the extent that a change in media emphasis on a
particular issue, led to a similar change in the public agenda. Prior research shows that
the media plays a key role in shaping community concerns and influencing community
expectations which in turn has an influence on corporate communications (O’Donovan,
2002; Brown & Deegan, 1998; Islam & Deegan, 2010; Deegan et al., 2000; Carroll &
McCombs, 2003; Deephouse, 2000). Islam & Deegan (2010) examined the media
pressure and corporate disclosure on social responsibility performance based on two
global clothing and sports retail companies operating in low-cost developing country. The
findings suggest that media attention influenced the community’s concern, and in
response to such concerns, corporations increased their disclosures on social
responsibility performance against poor labour practises in order to maintain their
legitimacy.
3.3 Responsive regulation theory
This paper also relies upon responsive regulation theory to understand how and whether
interventions by IGOs change the anti-bribery reporting behaviour of the multinational
companies. Responsive regulation posits that the regulatory environment becomes
responsive to perceived deficits in accountability (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992;
Braithwaite, 2002a, 2000b, 2006). Responsiveness is demonstrated as a democratic ideal
in which participants hold each other to account. In an environment where the state
escalates regulation due to a perceived deficit in corporate accountability, corporations
become responsive to these regulatory escalations (Braithwaite, 2006). According to
Braithwaite (2006), in a responsive environment, empowered civic engagement
(engagement of IGOs, NGOs, media, consumers and community) check abuse of power
in business self and state regulatory processes.

Responsive regulation theory posits that the deficits in accountability and lack of
responsiveness are resolved through new “strategies of networked governance”. This
15

theory therefore assumes that abuses of power, corporate bribery or corruptions is best
tackled via a plurality of disparate powers in a network of governance where IGOs have
strong networks with NGOs and media to discipline the corporations involved. The
vigilant visibility and actions of IGOs and their strategic collaborations with NGOs and
the media as a significant part of global regulatory environment are positioned to form a
networked governance to eliminate corruption and bribery. This network governance
creates a sense of regulatory mechanism that disciplines MNCs socially and ethically.

The insight provided within responsive regulation theory is that “if you [regulated actors]
keep breaking the law, it is going to be cheap for us [regulators] to hurt you because you
are going to help us hurt you” (Braithwaite, 2006, p.888). Therefore, regulatory
intervention escalates if the regulated actor is not a responsible citizen. The regulatory
intervention is not only directed at individual regulated corporations but is also applies to
entire industries (Baldwin & Black, 2007). While a wide range of actors including states,
industry associations, trade unions, professional bodies, IGOs may become regulators, the
role of NGOs and IGOs as regulators becomes fundamentally important (Braithwaite,
2006). The ability IGOs to escalate strikes and networked naming and shaming via their
network governance drives the company down to act in accordance with ‘restorative
justice’ (Braithwaite, 2006, p.893).

In recent times, there have been various enforcement, commitment and anti-bribery
actions to control and minimise bribery related activities and protect international
businesses as well as stakeholders in host countries. These include regulatory changes
such as the US Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA) 1977, UK anti-bribery and
corruption act 2010, and network governance systems taken by NGOs IGOs such as
United National Convention against Corruption, OECD Convention against bribery and
corruption over the past decade. Based on responsive regulation theory, it appears that
IGOs’ networked enforcement with investigative journalists create regulatory pressures
and generate demand for greater accountability by multinational corporations in relation
to corporate bribery. Multinational corporations are arguably responsive to the network of
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enforcement system when fighting bribery. This notion appears to be consistent with
legitimacy theory except that responsive regulation provides an additional mechanism
through regulation and networked governance (networking between stakeholders—IGOs,
NGOs and Media) to create a pressures on corporations to be responsive and to maintain
legitimacy. While legitimacy theory argues that increased disclosure is a response to a
crisis, the correlating argument to legitimacy, based on responsive regulation is that
increased disclosure prevents (or attempts to prevent) further regulatory intervention (see
Figure 1). Embracing responsive regulation theory, this study seeks to investigate how
two telecommunications corporations respond to anti-bribery movements and regulatory
escalations.
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Figure 1: Networked Governance

Media

NGOs

Responsive regulation

Threats to legitimacy
IGOs
Organisational
legitimacy
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Communication and the
adoption of IGO, NGO
initiatives

This paper relies on a combination of legitimacy theory, media-agenda setting theory and
responsive regulation to understand corporate disclosure patterns on combating bribe.
Increasing media attention and a networked governance of local and international
organisations combined with a perceived legitimacy threat is expected to influence
community concerns and their expectation to be informed of the company’s response to
bribery issues. Broader stakeholder concerns have raised community expectations of
corporations so that they not only take corrective measures to combat bribery but also
disclose such measures. The implication of policies and procedures on anti-bribery
programs within a company and the related disclosure patterns as well as volume is
expected to change with the advent of a legitimacy crisis as evidenced by increasing
media attention and regulatory enforcement or escalations of IGOs. Based on the
discussion above, the following questions are addressed in this paper:
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1. What is the nature and extent of disclosures on combating bribe by two
telecommunication companies under investigation and whether the extent of
disclosures by these companies has changed over time?
2. How do bribery scandals or accusations alter the reporting behaviour of
telecommunication companies under investigation who are directly involved in
bribery over time?
3. Whether media and IGOs have an influence on the disclosure practices in relation
combating bribe by the companies under examination.

4. Research Method
Alcatel-Lucent, a French based multinational company and Siemens AG, German based
multinational company were the analysed to understand their disclosure patterns in
response to bribery related external pressures that are inclusive of negative media, IGOs
movements and networked governance. These two global telecommunication companies
were selected among a group of high profile European companies that were highly
connected to incidents of bribery. The companies selected were directly involved in at
least one bribery incident as well as admitting guilt to such behaviour in a court or a
commission. In addition to relying on media attention to select the sample companies,
media articles were also used to provide insights into the bribery incidents relating the
companies. The media news in relation to bribery incidents was collected from the Dow
Jones FACTIVA during the sample period (January 1995 to December 2010) using key
words such as “bribery”, “corruption”, “court case” “bribe”, “foreign official”
“developing country”, “prosecution”, to filter the number of media articles in the relevant
period. As discussed above, both companies are leading global telecommunication giants,
operating in more than 100 countries with rapid expansion and growth in recent years.
The data in Table 2 provides the total negative number of media articles in the period
from 1995 to 2010 in relation to bribery incidents within the telecommunication industry
and the two companies examined in this study. The data in Table 2 shows that media
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attention towards corporate bribery prior to 2004 was negligible suggesting that bribery
was absent during this period, or if present, it failed to capture media attention. However
since 2004, over 2,200 articles were reported. In the case of Alcatel-Lucent, a total 313
negative media articles were reported against the company in the relevant period. In 2004
and 2010, 14 and 199 negative media articles relating to Alcatel-Lucent were recorded
representing 20.3% and 20.5% of the industry total respectively. Overall, of the total
bribery incidents reported within telecommunication industry, Alcatel-Lucent was
responsible for 13.7% of total negative media reported within the industry. In the case of
Siemens AG, a total of 138 negative media articles were reported for the sample period.
In 2007, the percentage of the company media articles (to industry media articles) had
reached 21.7% suggesting that Siemens AG was connected to major bribery incidents
relative to the industry total. Overall, the two companies represent almost 20% of the
negative attention towards bribery in the telecommunication industry.
Table 2: Media articles relating to bribe incident in Telecommunication
Industry
Year

Industry total

Alcatel-Lucent
% of Ind
Number
total
0
0%

Siemens AG
% of Ind
Number
total
0
0%

Sample total
Numbe % of Ind
r
total
0
0%

1995

1

1996

1

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

1
1
1
1
1
1
2
69
67
169
239
344
416
969

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
14
4
17
48
9
22
199

0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
20.3%
6.0%
10.0%
20%
2.6%
5.3%
20.5%

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
23
52
22
14
27

0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
13.6%
21.7%
6.4%
3.4%
2.8%

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
14
4
40
100
31
36
226

0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
20.3%
6.0%
23.7%
41.8%
9.0%
8.7%
23.3%

Total

2283

313

13.7%

138

6.0%

451

19.7%
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Corporations rely on a variety of media vehicles to disclose information to public
stakeholders such as annual reports, special purpose social and environmental reports,
and other forms of corporate communication such as web-based and media-based
disclosures. This study primarily relies on a content analysis of annual reports and
sustainability reports, which were regularly produced throughout the sample period from
1995 to 2010. As prior literature suggests, social disclosure content in annual reports is
limited, therefore this study also relies on disclosures in sustainability reports in order
capture the maximum content of disclosures (Unerman, 1999). This study analyses
company annual reports and sustainability reports for each company over the sixteen
years period from 1995 to 2010. The reports were primarily obtained from the company’s
website with some reports collected from the ‘OSIRIS’ database.

Globally, a number of IGOs including OECD, UN, TI, WB are actively involved in
developing and implementing various anti-bribery movements and guidelines (see Table
1). The anti-bribery guidelines of these IGOs’ were an integral part of this research
because they were used to develop an anti-bribery disclosure categorisation scheme or
index to allow the researchers to classify and measure corporate disclosure practices. In
undertaking the development of an index, reference was made to a number of documents
and guidelines released by various IGOs (see Appendix 1). This study relies on this index
to collect data on corporate disclosures in relation to bribery reduction activities. The
index developed from various guidelines were categorised according to five themes with
a total of 44 sub categorisations. The general themes include: (1) Accounting for
combating bribe; (2) Board and Senior Management Responsibility; (3) Building Human
Resource to Combat Bribe; (4) Responsible Business Relation; and (5) External
Verification and Assurance. This study relies on this categorisation scheme to collate and
analyse data extracted from annual reports and stand-alone sustainability reports on
combating bribery.
Prior social accounting literature has employed a variety of approaches to measure
corporate disclosures including the number of disclosures, amount/extent of disclosure or
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combination of both (Patten, 1992; Deegan & Rankin, 1996; Unerman, 1999; Islam &
Deegan, 2008; Haque & Deegan, 2009). The amount of disclosure reflects the degree of
importance that corporate executives attach to the issue which in turn reflects the
perceived threat to legitimacy. In order to measure the amount of disclosures, prior
literature relies on the number of sentences, the number of words, or the number of pages.
This study employed the amount of disclosures technique to capture the extent of
corporate disclosures by counting the number of sentences relating to the anti-bribery
disclosure index and its themes.

An in depth analysis of annual reports and sustainability reports was performed to
identify and measure the positive and negative disclosures on combating bribery.
Following from Brown & Deegan (1998), the content of disclosure is considered to be
negative if it contains information about the activities of the company or industry which
indicates that the bribe related actions of the company/industry are detrimental to society.
The content of disclosure is considered to be positive if it contains information about of
company or industry activities that are beneficial to the society. Consistent with the
theoretical proposition provided in this study, it is predicted that greater community
concern for issues pertaining to bribery resulting from an increase in media attention and
IGO movements, should be matched by greater corporate disclosures on combating bribe.

5. Results and Analysis
5.1 Alcatel-Lucent
5.1.1 Analysis of corporate disclosures on combating bribe in annual report and sustainability
report

The data in Table 3 reports the number of sentences on corporate disclosures on
combating bribery published in the annual and sustainability reports over the 16 years
period from 1995 to 2010. Corporate disclosures in annual reports on combating bribery
were first reported in 2001 with six sentences increasing progressively to 135 sentences
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in 2010. In each subsequent year from 2001, the number of sentences gradually increased
with the exception of 2005. An examination of the categories finds that the majority of
disclosures relate to Category 1 (Accounting for Combating Bribe) consisting of 361
sentences. The data in Category 1 reported a continuously upward trend of disclosures in
annual reports throughout the period with the exception of 2005. Corporate disclosures
on combating bribery under the remaining categories [Category 2 (Board & Senior
Management Responsibilities); Category 3 (Building Human Resources to Combat
Bribe); Category 4 (Responsible Business Relation); and Category 5 (External
Verification & Assurance)] fluctuated from period to period with no discernible trends
being apparent in the annual report.
Table 3: Alcatel-Lucent Corporate Disclosure on Combating Bribe (Number of Sentences reported)
Category 1

Category 2

Category 3

Category 4

Category 5

AR

SR

AR

SR

AR

SR

AR

SR

AR

SR

AR

SR

1995

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1996
1997

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

1998
1999

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

2000
2001

0
2

0
0

0
2

0
0

0
2

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
6

0
0

2002
2003

2
2

2
2

6
5

0
0

2
3

5
0

0
5

5
1

0
0

0
0

10
15

12
3

2004
2005

5
0

14
3

7
1

5
4

4
0

3
10

3
0

4
2

0
0

0
0

19
1

26
19

2006
2007

33
41

1
9

5
4

14
6

3
3

1
6

6
6

2
2

0
0

0
0

47
54

18
23

2008
2009

52
109

8
9

4
5

14
23

4
4

0
6

5
5

2
4

0
8

0
0

65
131

24
42

2010

115

16

7

33

3

23

2

6

8

4

135

82

54

32

28

16

4

483

249

Year

Total
361
64
46
99
28
Category 1: Accounting for combating bribe
Category 2: Board and senior management responsibilities
Category 3: Building human resources to combat bribe
Category 4: Responsible business relation
Category 5: External verification and assurance
AR: Annual Report
SR: Sustainability Report

Total
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In considering sustainability report disclosures, the number of sentences on combating
bribery commenced from 2002 (12 sentences) with small annual increments finishing
with 82 sentences in 2010. The trend, although smaller in size, appears to follow the trend
established in the annual reports. Overall, the company appears to have committed to
reporting larger amounts of corporate disclosures on combating bribery in the latter years
of the relevant period. In relation to the categories, the company disclosed the highest
amount of information (99 sentences) in Category 2 Board & Senior Management
Responsibilities. The next highest amount of disclosures (64 sentences) was found in
Category 1 Accounting for Combating Bribe. The remaining categories recorded 54
sentences for Category 3 Building Human Resources to Combat Bribe, and 28 sentences
for Category 4 Responsible Business Relation. Category 5 External Verification &
Assurance recorded the smallest amount of disclosure with four sentences suggesting that
the company is less active with external verification of bribery reduction strategies. In
general, the number of sentences on corporate disclosures reported in both annual and
sustainability reports show an upward trend over the sixteen years period from 1995 to
2010.
5.1.2 Analysis of media coverage and corporate disclosures

The data in Table 4 reports the negative media news events connected to bribery related
incidents together with negative and positive corporate disclosures in the annual and
sustainability reports on combating bribe. The first media reports on bribery related
matters appeared in 2004 which occurred in relation to Alcatel-Lucent officials charged
with offences on bribing Taiwanese government officials to win a telecom contract in
Taiwan. In this same period, the company disclosed higher amounts of corporate
disclosures in both types of reports, particularly the sustainability report. In 2004, the
company also disclosed the appointment of its Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) to
handle all compliance matters including incidents of bribery and corruption. One specific
role of the CCO was to oversee and monitor the implementation of the company’s
compliance activities, with a particular focus on Anti-corruption (Alcatel-Lucent,
Sustainability Report, 2004). Additionally, the company increased its anti-bribery and
corruption awareness and training program to all of its subunits including county,
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regional and local management, employee, contractors and suppliers, and to maintain a
tracking and feedback system to evaluate successful of these programs.

Table 4: Aggregated social disclosures and media attention by year- Alcatel-Lucent
Annual Reports

Sustainability Report

Year

Total
media
news

Total
sentences

Positive
sentences

Negative
sentences

Total
sentences

Positive
sentences

Negative
sentences

1995

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1996

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1997

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1998

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1999

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2000

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2001

0

6

6

0

0

0

0

2002

0

10

10

0

12

12

0

2003

0

15

15

0

3

3

0

2004

14

19

18

1

26

26

0

2005

4

1

1

0

19

19

0

2006

17

47

39

8

18

18

0

2007

48

54

47

7

23

23

0

2008

9

65

55

10

24

24

0

2009

22

131

119

12

42

42

0

2010

199

135

123

12

82

80

2

Total

313

483

433

50

249

247

2

The negative media news in relation to bribery incidents were reported in every year
since 2004. Negative media news emerged as a result of company employees including
management involved in breaching the company’s anti-bribery and corruption code and
practices. The company subsequently increased the amount of disclosures relating to antibribery code and practices in an attempt to promote ethical business practices worldwide.
Since 2004, negative media news were reported continuously against members the
company for charges relating to bribe and corruption. One major bribery incident was
reported in 2005-2006, in which the Costa Rican prosecutor’s office indicted eleven
individuals, including the former president of Alcatel de Costa Rica, on charges of
aggravated bribery of government officials in order to secure a telecom contract. As a
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result, this study found that the second highest number of negative media articles (48
negative media news) reported in 2007 relating to this incident. The highest number of
negative media news (199 news articles) was reported in 2010 with the number of
disclosures in sustainability reports doubling from 42 sentences to 82 sentences between
2009 and 2010. These disclosures related to the company’s settlement of more than
US$137m to the U.S. Department of Justice and Security and Exchange Commission,
representing one of highest settlements in corporate bribery history. The settlement is
connected to allegations of bribery as well as court and commission hearings between
December 2001 and June 2006 in Latin American and Asian countries.

The relationship between the negative media reports and positive corporate disclosure is
tested statistically using the Spearman rank order correlation. The results of the test
suggest that the annual report disclosures and negative media articles are strongly
correlated (rs=0.855, p=0.000). This positive correlation suggests that the increase in
negative media reports results in a corresponding increase of disclosures on anti-bribery
in the company’s annual reports. The Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficient
between negative media news and corporate disclosures in sustainability reports is also
significant (rs=0.900, p=0.000). The statistically significant results support the view
proposed in this study that negative media news has an influence on the changes in
corporate disclosures in relation to combating bribery over the sample period. The
positive correlations are consistent with the proposition under legitimacy theory that
increases in negative media news, results in a corresponding increase in social disclosures
in order to regain or maintain the company’s legitimacy.

The data in Table 4 on positive and negative corporate disclosures provides some
evidence on how corporations respond to negative media news. Overall, in the
disclosures to the annual reports, 88% (433 from 483 sentences) of sentences represented
positive disclosures and 99% (247 from 249 sentences) of sentences in sustainability
reports were also positive. The results in this study are consistent with prior literature (see
for example Deegan et al., 2002) which shows that corporations respond to negative
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media news through positive rather than negative corporate disclosure patterns. This
finding is also consistent with the view that a company which has been accused of a
serious negative event such as bribery responds with a need to counter the negative news
of their accusations with positive news about their anti-bribery initiatives. It appears from
this finding that companies feel a need to legitimise the existence of their operations by
increasing the disclosure of positive or ‘good’ information.
5.1.3 Analysis of IGOs anti-bribery movement and corporate disclosures
While media attention on bribery matters began in 2004, Alcatel-Lucent started to
disclose their anti-bribery information from 2001. The 2001 sustainability and annual
reports disclosed its commitment to TI, whose mission was to move governments
towards greater transparency in management and to curb national and international
bribery and corruption. Since 2001 the company reported their commitment toward the
conduct of business in accordance with code of ethics, and principles of good corporate
citizenship. This commitment was emphasised in the code with an obligation to fight
national and international bribery and corruption (Alcatel-Lucent, Annual Report, 2002,
p.16). The company also revealed how the central corporate team and network of
contacts in the group of companies were responsible for overseeing the group’s antibribery and corruption policy and the key role played by senior management.
Furthermore, management committed itself to adhering to the United Nations Global
Compact initiative in 2003 by implementing the principles to fight against all forms of
bribery and corruption (Alcatel-Lucent, Annual Report, 2004, p.37). Interestingly, two
years after the announcement of this commitment, members of team management were
accused of bribery allegations in 2004 and behaviour inconsistent with their code and
policies indicating that corporate disclosures on these matters are a response to external
pressure rather than a commitment to change.

In the period 2001 to 2003 that preceded media announcements of bribery which began in
2004, the company disclosed information in their annual and sustainability reports under
categories 1, 2, 3 and 4. In 2001 the company disclosed six sentences within the annual
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report (two sentences within Category 1, 2 and 3). There were no disclosures in the
sustainability report of 2001 but in 2002 and 2003, the company disclosed 10 sentences
and 15 sentences respectively within the annual reports. In the same period, the company
disclosed for the first time in its sustainability reports 12 sentences and three sentences
respectively. The corporate disclosures from 2001 to 2003 appeared to be associated with
the growing movement of IGOs such as TI, UN, WB and OECD, rather than a response
to media attention which began in 2004. Alcatel-Lucent’s anti-bribery disclosure
behaviour from 2001 to 2003 is consistent with the company’s desire to conform to the
expectations of the IGOs agenda for greater transparency and accountability to eliminate
corruption and bribery..

The media focus on the Costa Rica and Taiwan bribery incidents in 2004 brought
dramatic changes to the company’s internal control process as well as disclosure
practices. In the annual report 2004, possibly in response to the emerging pressure from
IGOs, the company stated it was adhering to the Global Compact initiative. In the
sustainability report of 2009, the company stated that it signed the World Economic
Forum Partnering against Corruption Initiative (PACI)—the initiative in which 137
companies globally became signatories. The findings in this study suggest a strong
statistical relationship between negative media attention and disclosures on combating
bribery in which IGO activities were prevalent in the relevant period. The increasing
relationship between corporate disclosures in annual and sustainability reports and IGOs’
initiatives 7 are displayed in Figure 1. It indicates that the trend in corporate disclosures on
combating bribe not only increased with time but coincided with IGO initiatives. While
media attention and corporate disclosures were positively correlated, IGOs became a
complementary (or networked) factor to create change in corporate disclosure practices.
The changing level of disclosures was associated with the joint consideration of media
agenda and the actions of IGOs—‘networked governance’ was able to influence the
disclosure behaviour of Alcatel-Lucent.

7

Table 1 provides the details of initiatives launched by IGOs in each year
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5.2 Siemens AG

52.1 Analysis of corporate disclosures on combating bribe in annual report and
sustainability report
The data in Table 5 indicates the extent of corporate disclosures on combating bribery by
Siemens AG that were reported in both the annual and sustainability reports during the
sample period. Siemens AG did not disclose any information in relation to anti-bribery
policies and procedures until 2002. In 2002 and 2003 the company reported limited
information in its sustainability reports in relation to Category 2 (Company Board &
Senior Management Responsibilities). In 2006, the company reported in its annual report
31 sentences of corporate disclosures on combating bribery. In 2007 the number of
disclosures in the annual report increased sharply to 140 sentences (covering all
categories of disclosure). At this point, disclosures increased more steadily rising to a
total of 172 sentences reported in 2010. In regard to the categories, the highest number of
disclosures (304 sentences) in annual reports was reported in Category 1 (Accounting for
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Combating Bribe). The second highest number of disclosures (160 sentences) were
reported in Category 2 (Board & Senior Management Responsibilities) followed by
Category 3 (Building Human Resources to Combat Bribe). Annual report disclosures
under the Categories 1 to 3 showed a continuous upward trend. The disclosures in
relation to other two categories; Category 4 (Responsible Business Relation) and
Category 5 (External Verification and Assurance), were small in size and tended to
fluctuate from period to period with no discernible or apparent trend.

Table 5 :Siemens AG Corporate Disclosure on Combating Bribe (Number of Sentences reported)

Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

Category 1

Category 2

Category 3

Category 4

Category 5

AR

SR

AR

SR

AR

SR

AR

SR

AR

SR

AR

SR

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
13
68
72
75
76

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
14
35
9
17

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
11
28
26
36
59

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
7
0
0
0
18
64
43
44

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
21
22
24
24

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
14
19
6
8

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
16
17
8
6

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
28
10
6

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
8
8
7

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
5
2
3

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
31
140
145
151
172

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
7
0
0
0
50
151
70
78

47

49

47

30

11

639

359

Total
304
75
160
179
96
Category 1: Accounting for combating bribe
Category 2: Board and senior management responsibilities
Category 3: Building human resources to combat bribe
Category 4: Responsible business relation
Category 5: External verification and assurance
AR: Annual Report
SR: Sustainability Report

Total

In sustainability report disclosures, the trend was less clear compared with the disclosures
that appeared in the annual reports. In 2007, 50 sentences of corporate disclosure were
reported increasing to 151 sentences in 2008 but then declined to 70 and 78 sentences in
2009 and 2010 respectively. In total, the highest amount of reporting (179 sentences)
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occurred under Category 2 (Board & Senior Management Responsibilities) with the
second highest amount of disclosures (75 sentences) found under Category 1 (Accounting
for Combating Bribe). In both companies, annual reports were dominated by Category 1
disclosures and sustainability reports were dominated by disclosures in Category 2. It
appears that companies prefer to report accounting related anti-bribery in annual reports
while management’s response or responsibilities to such issues are disclosed in
sustainability reports. The sustainability report disclosures under Category 1 (Accounting
for Combating Bribe), Category 2 (Board & Senior Management Responsibilities), and
Category 3 (Building Human Resources to Combat Bribe), showed continuous upward
trend while disclosures under Category 4 (Responsible Business Relation) and Category
5 (External Verification and Assurance) were minimal and tended to fluctuate from
period to period with no discernible trend being apparent over sixteen years period.

5.2.2 Analysis of media coverage and corporate disclosures

The data reported in Table 6 provides evidence of the negative media articles along with
positive and negative corporate disclosures on combating bribery in the sample period.
The media reports linked the company to bribery incidents from 2006 to 2010. Siemens
AG was involved in several bribery incidents since 2006 that include activities in Saudi
Arabia, Russia, and Italy. This study found that the highest number of negative media
news against Siemens AG was reported in 2007 with 52 negative media news items. In
the same period, the amount of annual report disclosures increased significantly from 31
sentences in 2006 to 140 sentences in 2007. In the sustainability reports, negative media
disclosures increased suddenly from 0 sentences in 2006 to 50 sentences in 2007
followed by 151 sentences in 2008. In 2007, Siemens AG appointed Chief Compliance
Officer to handle the complaints and launched the compliance help desk, along with its
“Ask us” function. This service was designed to become a central point of contact where
all managers and employees worldwide can submit queries to compliance experts for
professional guidance (Siemens AG, Sustainability Report, 2007). Furthermore, between
February and October 2007, 1,400 employees in management positions all over the world
received intensive training in antitrust law and anticorruption issues. The company
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targeted 100,000 employees to complete an online training program which dealt with
instruction on handling payments, accounting practices and gift and donation (Siemens
AG, Sustainability Report, 2007).

In spite of the company’s anti-bribery initiatives in 2007, the company in 2008 was again
linked to major bribery incidents in several countries including Greece, Nigeria and
Bangladesh. The number of negative media articles reported against the company
dropped from 2008, but in spite of the decline, negative media news continued to be
reported against the company. Even though the company was not formally linked to
major reportable bribery incidents in 2009 and 2010, the media reported negative news in
relation to prior incidents of bribery that were addressed in court hearings where the
company accepted an obligation to pay compensation.
Table 6: Aggregated social disclosures and media attention by year- Siemens AG

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

Total
media
news
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
23
52
22
14
27

Total
sentences
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
31
140
145
151
172

Total

138

639

Year

Annual Report
Positive
Negative
sentences
sentences
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
28
3
132
8
138
7
142
9
164
8
604
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Sustainability Report
Total
Positive
Negative
sentences
sentences
sentences
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
3
0
7
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
50
48
2
151
151
0
70
70
0
78
78
0
349

347

2

With increasing disclosures until the end of the observation period, Siemens appeared to
have maintained a high level of corporate disclosure practice on combating bribery.
Based on the Spearman rank order correlation, the results suggest that negative media
news is highly correlated with annual report disclosures (rs=0.948, p=0.000). This finding
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suggests that the company relies on annual report disclosures to counter the effects of
negative media news. Bribery issues attracted the greatest amount of negative media
attention within the five disclosure categories as well as providing the greatest amount of
positive annual report disclosures. The results support the findings of prior studies (see
for example: Pattern, 1992; Brown & Deegan, 1998; Deegan & Rankin, 1996; Deegan &
Islam, 2008) as well as being consistent with the theoretical proposition in this paper that
positive corporate disclosures is one response to external public scrutiny with negative
news.

The negative media articles and sustainability report disclosures appear to be infrequent
only occurring in a limited number of years (see Table 6). However, the resulting
association between unfavourable media news and social sustainability report disclosures
produced a Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficient of 0.678 (p=0.004). The results
indicate that while the correlation was not as strong as the annual report disclosures, the p
value for sustainability report was significant, indicating that sustainability report
disclosures were also responsive to unfavourable media articles. Overall, the company
disclosed more than 95% of positive disclosures (604 from 639 sentences) in annual
reports and more than 99% of positive disclosures (357 from 359 sentences) in
sustainability reports over the sample period. This result is consistent with prior literature
which found increasing positive social disclosures to counter the negative media attention
in order to regain or maintain their legitimacy in the society in which the company has
been charged or linked to socially unethical behaviour.
5.2.3 Analysis of NGOs anti-bribery movement and corporate disclosures
Siemens AG introduced a detailed anti-bribery code and procedures in 2008 in
collaboration with NGOs and IGOs. In that year, sustainability reports disclosed 151
sentences which was the highest amount of sentences reported in the sample period. The
company reported in great detail their collective action initiative and its cooperation with
other stakeholders in driving their activities to combat bribe and corruption. In spite of
the increased discourse activity since the bribery in 2004, the company first disclosed
their collaboration with NGOs to fight bribery and corruption in 2002 and 2003. In 2002
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and 2003, the company disclosed in its sustainability report its cooperation with TI to
fight corruption. In 2008 onwards, the company was more actively involved with external
parties, looking at different initiatives to combat bribe and corruption. In promoting fair
competition, the company launched collective action including participating in initiatives
and organisations for combating bribe and corruption. One such involvement includes the
World Bank Institute collective action working group.

The data in Figure 2 shows the trend of corporate disclosures on combating bribery
reported in Siemens AG annual and sustainability reports and the initiative of IGOs to
combat corporate bribery from 1995 to 2010. In considering the number of sentences
reported, the data indicates a positive upward trend during the relevant period. This was
not only responsive to negative media pressure but also responsive to emerging pressure
from the NGOs and IGOs. For example in 2008, Siemens AG reported in its
Sustainability Report (2008, p.68), that “Siemens AG is an active corporate member of
working group for the tenth principles (anti-corruption) of the UN Global Compact and
Commission on Anti-Corruption of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)”. This
statement shows that the company, as a member of the UN, is responsive to the initiatives
of IGO. The UN Convention against corruption launched in 2005 could have been the
impetus for corporate disclosures on combating bribery and corruption. From 2006,
corporate disclosures on combating bribery increased in every year irrespective of the
trend in negative media articles. For example in 2008, the number of negative media
articles dropped from 52 to 22 but the total amount of corporate disclosures increased
from 140 to 145 sentences. This disclosure trend suggests that corporate reporting and
initiatives to combat bribery are a response to the growing movement of IGOs ad well as
media scrutiny. Like Alcatel-Lucent, Siemens AG reported anti-bribery information to
conform to the expectations of IGOs.
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6. Conclusion
This study examined the relationship between the amount of negative media attention and
the actions of IGOs directed towards the bribe related activities of two major global
telecommunication companies (Alcatel-Lucent and Siemens AG), and the level of annual
and sustainability report performance disclosures on combating bribery over a 16 year
period between 1995-2010. This paper examined the change in disclosure over the
sample period as well as across the five categories comprising the anti-bribery index.
Alcatel-Lucent and Siemens AG disclosed the highest amount of reporting (number of
sentences) under Category 1 (Accounting for Combating Bribery), while disclosures
under Category 5 (External Verification and Assurance) reported the least amount of
sentences. The amount of total disclosure in annual reports is almost twice the amount
that appears in sustainability reports for both Alcatel-Lucent and Siemens AG, however
when disclosures were reported in sustainability reports, they were dominated by
Category 2 disclosures relating to board and senior management responsibilities. In
general, the increasing corporate disclosure directs attention away from the negative
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connotations associated with corruption and bribery and focuses attention on the
corporation’s anti-bribery activities.

The findings of this study suggest that since 2004, Alcatel-Lucent and Siemens AG
received widespread media attention impacting the level of anti-bribery disclosures.
Statistical analysis of the relationship between media attention and corporate disclosures
found that the positive disclosures were significantly associated with the media attention
supporting the view that media attention plays a role in influencing the amount of
corporate disclosures on anti-bribery measures. The results of this study conforms to
legitimation motives in which company’s disclose information on combating bribery
which is consistent with O’Donovan’s (1999) concluding comments that management
make annual report disclosures in response to news media coverage. This study also
found that the trend in such disclosures coincided with expectations of leading IGOs who
were promoting their anti-bribery agendas and guidelines for corporations to adopt anti
bribery policies and procedures. This finding suggests that corporations respond not only
to media pressure but also to an increase in external party movements (e.g. TI, UN,
OECD and the World Bank) to combat bribery. Overall, the amount of performance
disclosure on combating bribery increased in the latter years of the sample period
consistent with highest negative media coverage further impelled by NGO and IGO
pressure.

In sum, the findings of the study are twofold. First, the finding suggests that news media
attention influenced the anti- bribery disclosure practices of Alcatel-Lucent and Siemens
AG. This finding supports the conclusions of existing studies that find a positive
relationship between community concern (with media attention as a proxy for community
concern) and corporate social disclosures (see for example: Brown & Deegan, 1998;
Deegan, et al., 2002; Islam & Deegan, 2008). In addition to the role of the media, the
second part of the results suggests that, IGOs such as TI, OECD and World Bank also
had an influence over the disclosure practices of these two companies. Corporate
disclosures on combating bribery were closely associated with the combination of media
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attention and the influence of IGOs–a system of ‘networked governance’ that has not
been fully considered or explored by social accounting researchers to understand
disclosures practices of corporations. Furthermore, given the present voluntary nature of
IGOs’ to influence corporate activity, we argue that increased anti-bribery disclosures by
global telecommunication companies prevented further regulatory intervention created by
the IGOs.

Legitimacy theory is premised on the notion that societal norms, values and beliefs are
not fixed and organisations who respond to changing societal norms do so on the basis of
signals communicated by particular social and environmental events, media scrutiny and
networked-governance pressures. We can infer from such signals that issues with broad
social and political implications are likely to influence disclosure practices. Corporate
disclosures that denounce corruption demonstrate a company’s commitment to honesty
and integrity. A company’s fight against corruption communicates and reinforces a
perception that the company is acting in the public’s best interest. Interventions that
combat bribery show that companies are concerned for social welfare as much as their
economic imperative to make a profit. It is this component of its legitimacy activities,
sometimes referred to as moral legitimacy, that demonstrate an affiliation with social
norms. Further research could examine the corporate disclosures following a reduction in
media attention to determine if there is a corresponding fall in disclosures.

This study contributes to the existing literature, not found in prior literature, in different
ways. First, the issue of corporate bribery and related disclosure is unique and quite
different to other social and environmental issues examined in the prior research. Second,
in addition to annual report (see Islam & Deegan, 2010; Brown & Deegan, 1998),
sustainability reports were equally considered to understand the role of media in
influencing corporate disclosure practices. We found disclosures in sustainability reports
were positively associated with the media attention—a relationship which has not been
previously investigated. Third, we investigated the influence of IGOs over the antibribery reporting practices of two multinational companies and found that the disclosures
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were also associated with the expectations of IGOs such as TI, OECD and WB. Research
investigating how IGOs influence in the reporting behaviour of corporations is limited.
Finally, this study has added the notion of responsive regulation to legitimacy theory to
understand how networked governance and the interactions of NGOs-media influence on
anti-bribery corporate disclosures practices. The theoretical framework and industry
focus undertaken in this paper has not been considered in prior research.
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Appendix 1: Disclosure categories on combating corporate briberies
1. Accounting for combating bribe
1. The company prohibits all forms of bribery whether they take place directly or through
third parties
2. The company prohibits its employees from soliciting, arranging or accepting bribes
intended for the employee’s benefit or that of the employee’s family, friends, associates
or acquaintances.
3. The company, its employees or agent make clear commitments that they do not have
direct or indirect contribution to the political parties, organisations or individuals engaged
in politics, as a way of obtaining advantages in business transaction
4. The company discloses all its political contribution
5. The company ensures that charitable contribution and sponsorship are not used as a
subterfuge for bribery
6. The company publicly discloses all its charitable contribution and sponsorship
7. The company does not make facilitation payments and take initiative to identify and
eliminate them
8. The company prohibits the offer or receipt of gifts, hospitality or expenses whenever they
could affect or be perceived to affect the outcome of business transactions and are not
reasonable and bona fide.
9. The company establishes and maintains an effective system of internal control to counter
bribery, comprising financial and organisational checks and balances over the
enterprise’s accounting and record keeping practices and other business process related to
the program.
10. The company maintains available for inspection accurate books and records that properly
and fairly document all financial transaction
11. The company does not maintain off-the-books accounts. The company adopt financial
and tax accounting and auditing practices that prevent the establishment of “off the
books” or secret accounts or the creation of documents which do not properly and fairly
record the transactions to which they relate.
12. The company subjects the internal control systems, in particular the accounting and
record keeping practices, to regular review and audit to provide assurance on their design,
implementation and effectiveness.
13. Disclose number of violations
14. Report number of dismissals of employee

2. Board and senior management responsibilities
15. The board of Directors or equivalent body should commit to an anti-bribery policy and
program based on the business principles and provides leadership, resources and active
support for management’s implementation of the program.
16. The Chief Executive Officer is responsible for ensuring that the program is carried out
consistently with clear lines of authority
17. The board of Directors or equivalent body, Chief Executive Officer and senior
management should demonstrate visible and active commitment to the implementation of
the enterprise’s programme.
18. The company makes compliance with the programme mandatory for directors and applies
appropriate sanctions for violations of its programme.
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19. The company establishes feedback mechanisms and other internal processes supporting
the continuous improvement of the programme
20. Senior management of the company monitors the programme and periodically reviews
the program’s suitability, adequacy and effectiveness, and implements improvements as
appropriate.
21. Senior management should periodically report the results of the programme review to the
Audit Committee, Board or equivalent body.
22. Management offers dialogue with the NGO’s and public so as to promote its awareness
of and co-operation with the fight against bribery and extortion.
23. The audit committee, the board or equivalent body should make an independent
assessment of the adequacy of the programme and disclose its finding in the enterprise’s
annual report to shareholders.
24. Management participation in any industry groups against corruption or bribery.
3. Building human resources to combat bribe
25. Human resources practices including recruitment, promotion, training, performance
evaluation, remuneration and recognition should reflect the companies’ commitment to
the programme
26. The human resources policies and practices relevant to the programme are developed and
undertaken in consultation with employees, trade union or other employee representative
bodies a s appropriate.
27. The company makes it clear that no employee will suffer demotion, penalty or other
adverse consequences for refusing to pay bribes even if such refusal may result in the
enterprise losing business.
28. The company makes compliance with the programme mandatory for employees and
applies appropriate sanction for violations of its programme.
29. Directors, managers, employees and agents should receive appropriate training on the
programme.
30. Where appropriate, contractors and suppliers should receive training on the programme
31. reports percentage of employees trained in organisation’s anti-corruption policies and
procedures
4. Responsible business relation
32. The company monitors the programmes and performance of joint ventures and consortia;
in the case of policies and practices that are inconsistent with its own programme, the
enterprises should take appropriate action. This can include: requiring corrections of
deficiencies in the implementation of the programme; application of sanctions; or
termination of its participation in the joint venture or consortium
33. Where the company is unable to ensure that a joint venture or consortium has a
programme consistent with its own; it should have a plan to exit from the arrangement if
bribery occurs or is reasonably thought to have occurred
34. The company ensures that remuneration of agents is appropriate and for legitimate
services only. Where relevant, a list of agents employed in connection with transactions
with public bodies and state- owned enterprises should be kept and made available to
competent authorities.
35. The company contractually requires its agents and other intermediaries to keep proper
books and records available for inspections by the enterprise, auditors or investigating
authorities
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36. The company monitors the conduct of its agents and other intermediaries and should have
a right of termination in the event that they bribes or act in a manner inconsistent with the
enterprise’s programme
37. The company conducts its procurement practices in a fair and transparent manner
38. The company avoids dealing with contractors and suppliers known or reasonably
suspected to be paying bribes. It should undertake due diligence, as appropriate, in
evaluating prospective contractors and suppliers to ensure that they have effective anti
bribery programme
39. The company makes known its anti-bribery policies to contractors and suppliers
40. The company monitors significant contractors and suppliers as part of its regular review
of relationships with them and have a right to termination in the event that they pay
bribes or act in a manner inconsistent with the enterprise’s programme
41. Reports number of contracts terminated
5. External verification and assurance
42. The board or equivalent body should consider whether to commission external
verification or assurance of anti bribery policies and system to provide enhance internal
and external assurance of the programme’s effectiveness
43. Where such external verification or assurance is conducted, the board or equivalent body
should consider publicly disclosing that an external review has taken place, together with
the related verification or assurance opinion.
44. Assurance statement explicitly covers programme reporting
Disclosure Index developed from, but not limited to:
1. OECD (2008), OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises-Section VI: Combating
Bribery, OECD.
2. Transparency International (2009), the business principles for Countering Bribery- multistakeholder initiative led by Transparency International.
3. The U.S. enacted the Foreign Corrupted Practice Act 1977 (FCPA)
4. The 2008 UNCTAD publication Guidance on corporate responsibility indicators
5. UN convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)
6. Industry related group such as the anti-money laundering Wolfsberg group of leading
banks, the Oil and Gas producers, “Publish What You Pay” initiatives
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